




SecureCore



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<http://palms.ee.princeton.edu/securecore/>

Trustworthy Commodity Computation and Communication


- Goal: Security without compromising performance, cost and usability using **minimalist and integrated** security architecture
- Foundation for trustworthy commodity mobile computing and communications devices like **Dual-use Multi-Domain** PDA
- New **minimal security-aware processor (SP)** architecture to protect programs/data using cryptographic methods with trust for key-management, confidentiality and integrity rooted in HW
- New **least privilege separation-kernel** and **trusted services software** to enforce MAC and securely manage resources
- Detection/mitigation of covert and side channels at CPU, cache and system levels



Security-Aware Processor (SP) architecture

- User Mode for normal operation
- Authority Mode for remote transient trust
- Reduced mode for sensor nets
- MLS PDA support
- Discovery and closure of attacks on SP
 - key revocation attacks
 - memory replay attacks
- Mitigation of processor-cache-based covert and side channels.


- #### HW/SW Integration
- Trusted Mode w/Authority Mode
 - Access control for SP/CEM threads



- #### Adhoc Network Protocols
- Clean-slate protocol stack design examples using SP & layering optimizations

Separation kernel and trusted services software

- Transient-trust design
 - normal mode for COTS and trusted mode for high integrity operation
- Design for hosting OS and TOS, such as:
 - MLS policy interpretation - applying labels to blocks
 - Dynamic policy & resource changes
 - Scheduling and memory mapping for blocks and processes
- System Formal Security Policy Model prototype



SP HW Architecture

- User-mode: enables controlled and secure access to user's secrets
- Authority mode: enables **transient, policy-controlled trust** to third-party protected information, remotely
- Identified new SMT-based and speculation-based fast covert channels
- Proposed HW solutions against newly-discovered SW cache-based side channel attacks, without requiring SW changes

TML based Security Architecture and Integration

- New Multi-Domain **system architecture metrics**, compared 3 Security Architectures: SecureCore LPSK, MILS and Evaluated-Policy Security Kernel
- Trusted Path Application design to support transient trust usage model
- Initial set of hardware platform requirements
- **Extension and integration of SP** for covert-channel free sharing of crypto services

Adhoc Networking

- Probabilistic and deterministic mobile ad-hoc key-management, integrated with reduced mode SP



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